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Introduction 
This paper examines how changing systems and practices of local governance and health 
financing in China have influenced patterns of inequality in access to health services.1 These 
patterns of inequality are important because they can be closely connected to the patterns of 
income inequality discussed in other papers in this volume, as well as to experiences of 
poverty and social inequality, and to health inequalities. 2  First, for example, in health 
financing systems like China’s today, where health insurance participation is low and most 
people have to pay directly for health services, patterns of inequality in access map onto 
patterns of income inequality. In turn, people—particularly those with low incomes—who do 
not have health insurance are vulnerable to impoverishment due to ill health, so that 
inequalities in access may contribute to rising poverty and income inequalities. Second, where 
access to care is dependent on ability to pay, those on low incomes may be unable to afford 
the medical treatment they need, meaning that in China as elsewhere ‘unequal legitimate 
claims upon a health system, and unequal experiences of seeking care are important elements 
of poverty and inequality in people’s experience’ (Mackintosh 2001: 175). Third, inequalities 
in access to health services can interact with factors such as age, socio-economic differences 
or diet to contribute to increasing or reducing health inequalities (Peter and Evans 2001). 
 
The paper is divided into four main sections. Section 1 looks at institutions of local 
governance and their relationship with the provision and financing of health, and particular 
patterns of inequality in access to health services in the late 1970s, while Section 2 examines 
how changing institutions of governance and health financing produced substantially re-
shaped patterns of inequality in the 1980s-1990s. Section 3 considers how reforms since the 
                                                     
1
 Financial access relates to how financing arrangements affect ability to utilise health services. Physical access 
relates to how location or proximity of health service providers may affect utilisation. This paper concentrates on 
financial access, but its discussion of local differences in health service provision helps understand changing 
patterns of physical access. 
2
 Health inequalities are inequalities in health status as evidenced by for example differential life expectancy or 
experience of ill health. 
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late 1990s are affecting the patterns of inequality that emerged that decade. The concluding 
section discusses how evolving patterns of unequal access to health services relate to income, 
social and health inequalities in China, and what changes in wider systems of governance and 
public finance would be needed to provide health services and medical treatment more 
equally. 
 
The paper argues that in the late Mao era systems of health financing (state budgetary 
investment, co-operative medical systems in rural areas, and employer-financed health 
insurance in the cities) were tied closely to systems and practices of local governance (notably 
state planning, rural communes, and the urban work unit) and produced patterns of inequality 
characterised by a rural-urban divide, with the main differences in the countryside between 
localities and in the cities between work units. Since the late 1970s, rural-urban differential 
access has increased and neither health financing nor governance reforms have significantly 
challenged this divide. In the countryside, changes to systems and practices of local rural 
governance, notably the end of the commune system and fiscal decentralisation, led to 
changes in health financing and re-patterned inequality in financial access to health care so 
that interpersonal inequalities now overlie inter-local ones. In the context of continued fiscal 
decentralisation, attempts to re-establish cooperative systems of health financing (CMS) since 
the late 1980s have had limited success in most parts of the country, although, there has 
perhaps been more progress in wealthier rural areas. Unless fundamental financing and 
governance problems are tackled, progress with this reform and rural medical finance 
assistance (MFA) will be slow and both interpersonal and location-based inequalities in 
access are unlikely to be fundamentally challenged in the near future. 
 
In urban China, some changes in health financing (such as allowing health service providers 
to earn income from sales of medicine) preceded and contributed to changes in governance 
institutions (especially the erosion of the work unit system) in the 1980s and 1990s by 
pushing up health costs for both government and enterprise work units. As work units reneged 
on health insurance payments, made workers redundant, and went bankrupt, growing numbers 
of urban dwellers had to pay directly for their own medical treatment. This transformed 
patterns of inequality in access to health care from mainly employment-based ones 
determined by work unit to interpersonal (or household) ones based on ability to pay. 
Compulsory basic social health insurance (BSHI) introduced across urban China since the late 
1990s involves risk-pooling at the city level and so reduces some of the interpersonal 
inequalities in financial access among those who participate. A shift to a location-based 
differentials in access is now emerging, though the differences between cities are limited by a 
national framework of provision. BSHI also involves an important change in systems and 
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practices of local governance because along with urban MFA for the poorest, it has shifted 
responsibility for provision from employers to the local government. However, some 
continuities in wider governance practices mean that many working in the private sector, or 
informally in the state sector, as well as the non-working population, are excluded, leaving 
them and their families vulnerable to impoverishment due to illness. Although MFA is now 
being extended, it is not yet adequately financed and administered and so remains an 
unreliable safety net for the poor. The paper concludes that contemporary patterns of 
inequality in access can be tackled by reforms of financing systems as well improvements in 
local government capacity in the health sector. 
 
Late Mao local governance, financing, and inter-local and inter-work unit patterns of 
inequality in access to health care 
By the late 1970s, health service provision and financing in China was linked to wider 
systems and practices of governance in at least two important ways. First, the organisation of 
health services was mapped onto structures of local government administration, economic 
production, and social control. Health services were organised and administered by local 
government health departments and the key organisations of rural and urban governance, the 
commune and the work unit. Second, health was financed through a combination of local 
government budgetary investment, rural collective funds, and urban employers, in line with 
the wider planning and fiscal practices of the command economy. In both cities and 
countryside local governments allocated parts of their budgets to capital investment, 
preventive public health programmes, and the running costs of hospitals, including salaries. 
This helped extend health services across China from the 1950s, improving the availability of 
at least basic services. A World Bank study has noted that by 1975 ‘almost all the urban 
population and 85 per cent of the rural’ had insurance or CMS, and this provided people with 
‘access to cost-effective preventive and curative health services and some sharing of the risks 
of medically caused financial misfortune’ (World Bank 1997: 2). The system is generally 
credited with contributing to significant gains in health and life expectancy (World Bank 
1992). 
  
Rural governance, health financing and inter-local patterns of inequality 
In the countryside, a three-tier system of counties, communes, and production brigades 
administered and delivered health services and programmes (World Bank 1983). There were 
hospitals at county level, communes would have a health centre that provided referral services 
and supervised preventive work, and many villages (or production brigades) had a health 
station staffed by ‘barefoot doctors’ (Bloom and Gu 1997b). Commune health centres were 
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administered by the local commune management committee and party committee. They were 
supervised and supported technologically by the county level general hospital, maternal and 
child health hospital, and anti-epidemic station. These three county health care institutions 
were in turn administered by the county health bureau. This brought a network of health 
services to many rural areas that had not had them before.  
 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, within governance structures shaped by the commune 
system some form of CMS was established in most villages.3 As some authors have noted, 
this system of health financing ‘was an integrated part of the overall system of collective 
agriculture production and social services’ (Liu et al. 1999: 1354). Although CMS schemes 
were sometimes subsidised by government budgets, especially for vaccines and 
contraceptives, health campaign materials, and training of local medical personnel4, they were 
mainly funded by households, brigades and commune welfare funds so that in effect rural 
communities financed most of their own health services, especially curative care (Huang 
1988; Kan 1990:42). 
 
In terms of the three-tier system of health service providers, this meant that there was more 
state financing for county and sometimes commune level, but little for the level below that. 
County level service providers were funded entirely from the state budget, while commune 
health centres, often small hospitals, were funded from a combination of ‘contributions from 
the commune welfare fund, transfers of funds from the co-operative medical funds of the 
brigades under its jurisdiction, cost-sharing with users, and subsidies from the county and 
provincial government’ (World Bank 1983: 49).5 Brigade medical stations were financed co-
operatively by premiums from members of the production brigade and contributions from the 
brigade’s welfare fund, as well a user fees, income from sales of medicinal herbs, and 
‘various subsidies from the commune, county, province and state’ (World Bank 1983: 49).  
 
As a result of tying health service provision to a penetrative government administrative 
system, physical access to health services were improved for many rural dwellers in the late 
Mao era. However, for people living in mountainous areas or those without good transport 
                                                     
3
 The first CMS-type schemes were introduced experimentally from 1955 in Henan and Shanxi. They were 
established more widely from the late 1960s. By the mid-1970s more than 90% of brigades are thought to have had 
such a scheme (Feng et al. 1995; Kan 1990).  
4
 There was also effectively government subsidy for western drugs because their prices were set artificially low 
(World Bank 1983). 
5
 There was, however, great variety in the detail of local funding arrangements. For example, higher levels might 
fund all the salaries of the commune hospital, or only some of them. 
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connections, the nearest hospital could be beyond easy reach. Inequality in financial access to 
health services was also patterned primarily on an inter-local basis. While risk-pooling at 
brigade level ensured that its members probably had relatively equal access to basic outpatient 
medical treatment, the quality and range of treatments available were dependent on the 
amount of money raised by members of the production brigade and the amount that the 
brigade, commune and county were able and willing to subsidise the co-operative funds. ‘The 
more affluent communities can afford to subsidize health care costs, invest more to increase 
the quantity and raise the quality of their health personnel, and enjoy easier access to better 
health care, relative to the less affluent communities’, whereas ‘some of the poorest brigades 
and teams hav[e] reportedly cut back their provision of services in recent years’ (World Bank 
1983: 50, 9).  
 
Urban governance, health financing and work unit-based patterns of inequality 
Urban health services were provided through hospitals and clinics beneath the Ministry of 
Health and its municipal and district health bureaux, and separately though the military, some 
large state enterprises, and public institutions such as universities, which often had their own 
clinics and hospitals that provided health services direct to their personnel and dependants 
(World Bank 1983). Within the Ministry of Health system, there were in addition to 
municipal and district hospitals, small neighbourhood hospitals or health ‘stations’, which 
were relatively autonomous during the Cultural Revolution. Finally, there were health stations 
organised around resident committee organisations and staffed by supervised paramedics 
called ‘red medical workers’ who assisted with neighbourhood preventive work and offered 
some very simple diagnostic and curative services (Sidel and Sidel 1982). Local governments 
(cities and districts) funded Ministry of Health system hospitals while military and work unit 
hospitals were funded through budgets for their own systems (xitong), all within the wider 
planning and budgetary arrangements of the command economy.  
 
In addition to municipal and district government financing of health service provision within 
state plans, from the 1950s many urban dwellers’ medical expenses, paid for by employers, or 
‘work units’ (danwei), formed another important source of investment. Work units were state 
or collective sector employers that provided for urban workers and delivered urban public 
goods, while at the same time were a mechanism for their control and a cornerstone of 
structures and practices of urban governance (Lü and Perry 1997). There were two 
programmes of work unit-financed medical care: one for workers in enterprises (mainly state 
and collective enterprises) under ‘labour insurance’ (laodong baoxian, hereafter LI) and one 
for government and public sector employees (such as officials, teachers, doctors, students) 
under ‘publicly-financed health insurance’ (gongfei yiliao baoxian, hereafter PHI). LI was 
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financed by enterprises, though of course within the planning system, so that expenditures on 
employees’ medical treatment were factored into enterprise plans under soft budget 
constraints. PHI was financed directly from the budgets of the relevant level of government, 
so that for example central government financed the payments of public sector institutions at 
the centre. Neither LI nor PHI involved individual employees making contributions or 
significant co-payments6, and patients usually received treatment free at the point of delivery, 
paying only a nominal registration fee on arrival at a clinic or hospital (Yin 1997). 
Additionally, enterprise work units paid half the medical expenses of their employees’ 
dependants. 
 
Patterns of financial inequality in access to urban health services in the late 1970s were thus 
based mainly on employer and employment status, and tied to the fundamental institution of 
urban governance, the work unit. The generosity of health insurance varied, and was 
influenced by a work unit’s administrative level as well as individual factors such as an 
employee’s rank, contract type, or political label.7 Thus those with access to the best curative 
services free at the point of delivery were central government officials and workers in central 
government-level state enterprises, while local officials and workers in small urban 
government collectives received less generous assistance. 8  And provision was better for 
employees with high rank and/or permanent posts than for lower-ranking officials, workers 
with temporary contracts and rural migrants to the cities, while political ‘rightists’ were 
deprived altogether of any entitlements.9 
 
Overlapping and intersecting patterns of inequality 
As well as the intra-rural and intra-urban inequalities in access to health care discussed above, 
there were also in the late Mao era significant inequalities in access between urban and rural 
areas. Cities received a greater share of government investment in health, resulting in more 
hospital beds and doctors per head of population and meaning better physical access for urban 
dwellers (World Bank 1983). In 1975, for example, there were 4.6 hospital beds per thousand 
people in the cities, but only 1.2 per thousand in rural counties, and 2.7 doctors per thousand 
in the cities but only 0.7 per thousand in the countryside (Ministry of Health 2000: 426). Both 
                                                     
6
 Co-payments refer to direct out of pocket payments by patients alongside those made by the insurer. 
7
 Negative political labels (such as ‘rightist’ or ‘capitalist roader’) assigned to individuals in the leftist Mao era 
were often accompanied by sanctions and persecution ranging from social exclusion through withdrawal of 
entitlements to imprisonment. 
8
 On how state enterprise employees get ‘more extensive benefits’, including health care, in terms of both quantity 
and quality, than collective sector employees, see Whyte and Parish (1984), and Davis (1988). 
9
 See Duckett (2004), drawing for this information on  Dixon (1981). 
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this and rural-urban inequalities in financial access to health services were due to high levels 
of funding for LI and PHI by enterprises and the state, while in rural areas CMS was self-
funded and much less generous. In terms of health expenditures, in 1980, 34 per cent of health 
spending was on urban PHI and LI alone, when China’s urban population was only 19 per 
cent of the total (Hossain 1997; State Statistical Bureau of China 1992). In addition, central 
and local government budgetary spending on health (excluding PHI and LI), which was about 
25 per cent of total health spending, will have been disproportionately targeted at urban areas 
(Hossain 1997). Studies in the early 1980s showed that total urban per capita expenditure on 
health was three times that in rural areas (Liu et al. 1995).  
  
Overlapping patterns of inequality in access between and within countryside and city arising 
from unequal government budgetary spending and differences in local and work unit resource 
endowments will also have contributed to other still poorly-understood intersecting patterns 
of inequality caused by factors such as age and gender discrimination in employment. For 
example, because higher ranking (often heavy industrial) work units tended to employ men, 
while less well-resourced urban local government collectives tended to employ women, 
women were less likely to be directly entitled to better quality health care.10 Indeed, access to 
health care for many women (as well as children) will have been through their status as 
dependants of male workers. And the fact that enterprises usually paid for only half the 
medical costs of dependants can be expected to have had real effects on their abilities to seek 
treatment.11  
 
Local governance and health finance in the era of market reform: growing individual 
inequalities in access to health care 
As is well-known, key features of the late Mao systems and practices of local governance 
underpinning health service provision and finance were transformed with the turn to market-
led economic growth in the 1980s. The system of rural governance based on the communes 
was dismantled as townships replaced the communes and agricultural production was 
devolved to rural households. Urban governance practices centred on the work unit eroded 
over this period as state and collective enterprises were encouraged to become more efficient 
                                                     
10
 Bauer et al. (1992) report that a survey in 1987 found that women were only a third of employees in state 
enterprises, but almost half of those in urban collective enterprises. They also found men to be more concentrated 
in higher-paying industrial sectors and to be a large proportion of employees in government and party 
organisations. 
11
 See for example Östlin et al. (2001) on how a range of intra-household and other factors can limit women’s 
access to health services. 
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and competitive while growing numbers of urban dwellers worked in the private sector.12 
Underpinning all this was the introduction of market mechanisms to replace planning ones in 
the allocation of goods and resources, and fiscal decentralisation that increased local 
government autonomy and reduced the state’s redistributive capacity (Naughton 1996; Park et 
al. 1996).  
 
These transformations in wider systems and practices of governance had direct and dramatic 
effects on the provision and financing of health services. Dismantling rural communes led to a 
collapse in CMS, while market competition meant that poorly performing enterprise work 
units were no longer able to afford generous health provision for their workers. At the same 
time, fiscal decentralisation caused budgetary investment in health services to become less 
redistributive so that many hospitals were short of finance and increasingly reliant on 
generating their own income. The decentralisation of government responsibilities for hospitals 
that accompanied fiscal decentralisation has also contributed to problems regulating them. 
These changes together with the growth of private practice have raised the costs of health care 
and resulted in increased inequalities in patterns of provision as well as increased and re-
shaped patterns of inequality in financial access. The transformations in health services 
provision and financing and their effects on access are set out in more detail below. 
 
The collapse of CMS 
The abolition of communes and introduction of household farming in the late 1970s and early 
1980s led to the collapse of cooperative health financing in many parts of rural China. The 
share of villages with CMS fell from an estimated 90 per cent in the late 1970s to less than 
five per cent by 1984 (Carrin et al. 1999; Feng et al. 1995: 1112; Grogan 1995). This had an 
enormous impact on patterns of inequality in financial access to health services because it 
meant that in most villages risk-pooling and collective cover ended as CMS funds ceased to 
exist.13 Individuals and households increasingly had to pay for their own curative treatment, 
and often even for preventive services such as vaccinations and immunisations. In 1980, 
individual patient fees were 23 per cent of total health spending, but the share had risen to 39 
per cent in 1991 (Hossain 1997). On one mid-1990s analysis, approximately 95 per cent of 
rural residents were paying for their own care (Grogan 1995). Where CMS funds could no 
longer pay village health workers (formerly ‘barefoot doctors’), they could be forced to 
                                                     
12
 Most private sector employers do not provide the same range of benefits as state and collective work units once 
did (though for a discussion of some exceptions see Francis 1996).  
13
 Rural cooperative health funds accounted for 17 per cent of total health spending nationally in 1980 but had 
declined to less than 6 per cent in 1983 (Hossain 1997). 
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charge fees, sell medicines, be driven out of medical practice, or have to move to other areas 
(Feng et al. 1995: 1113). As a result there was a decline in the number of village health 
stations and rural health services had lost 3.7 million employees by the late 1980s (Hillier and 
Jie 1996; Hillier and Zheng 1991). 
 
Uneven urban work unit health finance and provision 
In the cities, the key institution of local governance, the work unit, was not suddenly 
dismantled, but eroded more gradually, in part due to the growing burden of the health 
benefits it provided. From the late 1980s, as urban industrial reforms began to encourage 
greater competition among enterprises, the numbers of employees entitled to benefits 
increased (particularly in older enterprises with larger numbers of retired workers), and 
medical costs rose (due to policies discussed below), health financing began to feel more 
burdensome for employers.14 As a result, they increasingly either reneged completely on their 
commitment to pay for their employees’ health treatment, introduced patient co-payments, or 
simply paid small annual or monthly lump sums to employees for health care regardless of 
their actual health care needs. As cities, government administrative systems (xitong), and 
employers across the country experimented with different arrangements, work unit provision 
began to vary, and increasingly employees found that they had to pay directly for their own 
curative care. The likelihood of this grew during the 1990s as more and more people became 
self-employed or shifted to private sector or informal employment, where they were much 
less likely to have work unit assistance with their medical costs. 15  The 1993 and 1998 
National Health Services Surveys revealed that the percentage of urban dwellers without 
health insurance had increased from 27 to 44 per cent between the two survey years (Liu et al. 
2002).16 And by the 1990s, whether someone had LI or PHI (or assistance with medical costs 
of any kind) was still dependent on whether or not they had work and their employer provided 
such benefits. Those most likely to have good access were still higher ranking officials and 
                                                     
14
 Total expenditures on labour and government employee health insurance had risen almost five times between 
1980 and 1990, from 670 million yuan to 3,236 million yuan (at 1980 prices) (Gu and Tang 1995). 
15
 The numbers employed in state work units (guoyou danwei) declined from a peak of 112 million in 1995 to 76 
million at the end of 2001, and the number in urban collective enterprises declined from 36 million in 1991 to 13 
million at the end of 2001. Meanwhile the number employed in private enterprises rose from 0.7 million in 1991 to 
15 million at the end of 2001, and the numbers of self-employed rose from 7 million to 21 million over the same 
period (State Statistical Bureau of China 2001, 1996). The registered unemployed, who are entitled to 
unemployment benefits, should also have their medical costs paid, but only during the period they are entitled to 
benefits, a maximum of two years. Many of the unemployed are not actually registered as such. 
16
 And a restricted access official source noted from a survey of 11 cities in the late 1990s found only 14% of 
urban dwellers to have health insurance (cited in Duckett 2004) . Only 3.17% of urban dwellers and 1.4% of rural 
dwellers had private health insurance in 1998 (Liu 2002). 
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people in public institutions, as well as workers in state enterprises that continued to do well 
(Tang and Parish 2000). 
 
Decentralisation and the emergence of private practice 
In addition to these changes to rural collective and urban work unit sources of finance for 
health, a number of other transformations to health system finance also affected provision of, 
and access to, health services. First, fiscal decentralisation in the health sector meant that 
budgetary finance for health came from local government coffers, so that for example, in rural 
areas township hospitals were no longer subsidised by counties and the task of handling local 
health policy at sub-county level was left to township officials who did not understand it 
well. 17  Second, because local government officials were given incentives to prioritise 
economic growth through the inclusion of economic indicators in their performance targets, 
spending on health was relatively neglected (Edin 2003; Park et al. 1996). Third, another 
series of policies has increased all state (including township) hospitals’ autonomy and 
financial self-reliance. In 1983 a State Council circular began the practice of permitting 
hospital staff to earn bonuses for extra work and hospitals to retain profits for reinvestment 
(Hillier and Jie 1996: 261). This resulted in incentives for them to provide unnecessary 
diagnostic tests, medicine and curative care, as well as meaning that patients have become 
prey to unethical treatment by medical professionals. Together, all these factors contributed to 
hospitals receiving a declining share of state budgetary support, so that by the early 1990s 
only about 20-25 per cent of hospital expenditures were financed in this way (Hsiao and Liu 
1996).18 In some areas, health centres closed, with the total number of township health centres 
falling by 14 per cent between 1980 and 1990, probably reducing the availability of health 
services for some rural dwellers, especially those in poorer areas (Feng et al. 1995). 
 
Further changes resulted from allowing private doctors to practice and the private ownership 
of health facilities (Hsiao 1995).19 Village (formerly brigade) health stations, previously run 
and financed through CMS, were often sold off to private practitioners, and medical personnel 
were permitted to provide private services outside their state hospital shifts (Ho 1995). 
Between 1980 and 1995, the share of the medical personnel in private practice grew from zero 
to five per cent, though private hospital numbers have grown much more slowly (Hindle 
                                                     
17
 Similar decentralisation has taken place in urban areas, but there are no accounts of the effects in terms of 
management capacity and investment of urban districts. 
18
 Overall there was, as a result, a decline in the government budgetary share of spending on health as a percentage 
of total health spending from 36% in 1980 to 15% in 2002 (Ministry of Health 2004). Central government funding 
of health care had fallen to less than 1% by the early 1990s (Hesketh and Zhu 1997).  
19
 Doctors were encouraged to set up private practices from 1980 (Ho 1995). 
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2000). The result of the expansion of private services has been that in wealthier areas 
provision has increased, and better technology has been available, while in poorer areas where 
medical practice incomes are lower, practitioners have financial problems, and so have been 
leaving for wealthier areas where they can make a better living (Feng et al. 1995). There has 
also been a decline in preventive programmes in some rural areas (Bloom and Gu 1997a). 
 
Changing patterns of unequal access 
These fundamental transformations to rural communes and the urban work unit, along with 
the decentralisation of health service finance, and permission for private practice, 
reconfigured locality- and work unit-based patterns of unequal access to health services in the 
1980s and 1990s. Locality still affected the quality of services available, and differences 
between localities in the quality and quantity of provision increased, widening the rural-urban 
divide.20 But an interpersonal pattern of inequality in financial access to health care had begun 
to overlie those based on locality and work unit. For the many no longer participating in CMS 
or protected by work unit provision, access was dependent on individual (or household) 
ability to pay, and individuals and families on low incomes were more likely to defer care or 
leave their illnesses untreated. Gu and Tang (1995) report that the 1988 National Household 
Survey showed 25 per cent of the rural population referred to hospital were unable to attend 
for treatment because they could not afford it. Similarly, the 1993 National Health Services 
Survey found that almost 40 per cent of the urban population reported that they could not 
afford the medical treatment they had been diagnosed as needing (Liu et al. 1999). And there 
had been little improvement toward the end of the decade, with research in 1998 finding that 
among poor urban households between 50 and 70 per cent could not afford medical 
treatment.21 Another study has shown that those with government or labour insurance were 
more likely to seek medical treatment and twice as likely to receive hospital treatment 
(Grogan 1995).  
 
These emergent patterns of interpersonal inequalities in access may have overlapped with and 
reinforced growing income inequalities that are often themselves influenced by interactions 
                                                     
20
 The World Bank reports that in 1993, average health spending per capita was four times higher in urban than in 
rural areas and ‘the poorest quarter of the rural population accounted for only about 5% of all health spending’ that 
year (World Bank 1997: 3). This source also notes that although the urban PHI and LI systems covered only 15% 
of the population, they accounted for ‘two-thirds of public spending on health and 36 per cent of all health 
spending’ (Ibid). 
21
 The figure was 50% in Shanghai, and 70% in Tianjin (see Cui 2004 citing Tang 2002). Note, however, that 
according to the Ministry of Health in 1999 20% of the urban population went without hospital treatment because 
they could not afford it (Liu et al. 2002). 
Duckett/Inequalities in access to health care 
 12 
among household registration, gender and employment status.22 For example, Grogan (1995) 
shows how in urban China in the market reform period those with the highest wages receive 
the best benefits, while the growing numbers of people with agricultural household 
registration working in the cities on low incomes are unlikely to be given assistance (Solinger 
1999). And women were more likely to be employed in low-paying urban collectives that 
found it harder to provide assistance with medical treatment costs. Those without work and 
income, particularly the long-term unemployed, were increasingly likely to have no health 
insurance, while middle-aged men and especially women were disproportionately represented 
among urban unemployed and laid-off workers, and usually among the first to lose their jobs 
when enterprises retrench. They were therefore less likely overall to be receiving work unit 
assistance with health care. 
 
The limits of reform to health system financing and new patterns of unequal access 
This section examines late 1990s’ attempts to reform the system of health financing and their 
outcomes in terms of inequality in access to health services. In rural areas since the mid-
1990s, reforms have focussed on the re-establishment of cooperative, risk-pooling financing 
based on voluntary payments by rural dwellers.23  In urban areas, LI and PHI are being 
replaced by a single basic compulsory social health insurance system for people in work, with 
risk-pooling at city level, and contributions made by employers and employees. In both 
countryside and cities, medical financial assistance (yiliao jiuzhu, MFA) programmes have 
begun to be introduced to help the poor with their medical costs. While indicating that 
collective (redistributory, risk-pooling) solutions have not entirely been abandoned, these 
reforms are all encountering problems so that interpersonal inequalities remain significant.  
 
Attempts to re-establish CMS, continuing patterns of inequality, and local governance 
problems 
Since 1993, the Chinese central government has attempted several times to re-establish some 
form of CMS in rural areas, but to little effect. In 1994, in conjunction with the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), trials were initiated in 14 counties across seven provinces24, and efforts 
were again renewed in 1997, when a target was set of extending the system to most of the 
                                                     
22
 ‘Household registration’ refers to the system by which everyone in China is assigned at birth either ‘agricultural’ 
or ‘non-agricultural’ registration that entitles them to different public goods and benefits. The urban ‘non-
agricultural’ registration brings better entitlements. 
23
 There have also been attempts to establish ‘prepaid prevention programmes’, but there is not the space to discuss 
them here. See Liu et al. (2002). 
24
 These experiments included some county and/or township government budgetary contribution, with different 
arrangements in different localities. 
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rural population by 2000 (Shi 2003; Xinhua (Anhui) 2002). Despite this, the second National 
Health Services Survey in 1998 found that only about seven per cent of rural dwellers were 
participating in CMS, and thereafter the trials received little publicity (Liu et al. 2002). In 
May 2001, a State Council document on rural reform and development mentioned CMS, but 
without setting targets or prioritising it (State Council System Reform Office et al. 2001).  
 
From 2002, there was renewed central policy emphasis on re-establishing CMS. In October 
that year the Party Central Committee and State Council issued a ‘Decision’ on improving 
rural health work that instructed all areas to set up CMS pilots and gradually promote ‘new-
type’ CMS with the target of ‘basically covering rural dwellers’ by 2010 (Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council 2002). Since then, there have been 
concerted efforts to make progress with these trials (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, 
and Ministry of Agriculture 2003; Ministry of Health Office 2003; State Council 2003), and 
the importance of the CMS work has been reiterated by the Vice-Premier and Minister of 
Health, Wu Yi, and Deputy Minister Gao Qiang (Gao 2004; Wu 2004). Although these 
speeches and documents reveal that there have already been problems, particularly with local 
governments overstating participation in the pilots, and in August 2003 they were narrowed to 
four provinces, CMS does now seem to be a priority for the State Council and the Ministry of 
Health. By June 2004, 69 million rural residents were reported as participating in ‘new-type 
CMS’ trials, equivalent to just under nine per cent of the 768.5 million rural population (State 
Council 2004). 
 
MFA schemes aimed at improving access to health care for the poorest were piloted in rural 
areas from 1998 through World Bank and UK government-funded programmes in 
conjunction with the Chinese Ministry of Health, and in 2002 were introduced as national 
policy. Those eligible for MFA are the poorest households, including but not limited to 
families receiving poverty relief (wubaohu). MFA can take the form of direct assistance with 
health expenses for preventive as well as hospital treatment costs, or assistance to allow 
households to participate in CMS. Although local governments are required to help fund 
MFA, from 2003 the central government announced that it would contribute 10 yuan per 
CMS participant in China’s middle and Western regions (Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party and State Council 2002). In November 2003 it was announced that the 
MFA system should be set up by 2005, beginning with 2-3 pilots in each province (Ministry 
of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Finance 2003). While a significant step 
toward tackling inequalities in access to health care and improving the access for poor rural 
dwellers, because MFA pays only a share of expenses it does not protect the poorest, and may 
not be affordable for governments in the poorest localities where they are most needed. By 
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1999, the Ministry of Health was still reporting that 23 per cent of the rural population had to 
forego hospital treatment because they could not afford it (Liu et al. 2002). 
 
With less than ten per cent of the rural population participating in CMS, patterns of inequality 
in financial access to health services in rural areas that appeared after the abolition of the 
communes remain, and are still mainly interpersonal or inter-household and closely connected 
with income inequalities.25 While some rural dwellers participate in collective systems and 
have access to MFA or may be able to afford to take out private insurance, most must still pay 
directly for their own medical treatment and risk impoverishment from serious illness. Since 
CMS and MFA are most likely in the wealthiest areas, inter-local inequalities underlie 
interpersonal ones.  
 
Problems establishing some form of CMS (as well as institutionalising MFA) are due in part 
to the fact that structures and practices of local governance resulting in the initial collapse of 
co-operative medical systems are still in place: notably decentralised production and local 
government finance. When coupled with prioritisation of economic growth throughout the 
political system that produces local government leader performance evaluations based mainly 
on economic indicators, there is a local unwillingness to subsidise CMS or raise investment in 
the health system. At the same time, these governance structures and practices have led to 
problems of predatory local government and low levels of trust in it. Thus attempts to 
establish CMS are met with suspicion from farmers who see it as yet another means to extract 
income from them.26 Indeed, central policies to tackle the problem of farmers being burdened 
with local taxes and fees have also damaged efforts to re-establish CMS (Liu et al. 2002).27  
 
Recent developments indicate that top leaders, particularly Vice-premier Wu Yi, now also 
Minister of Health, seem to be pushing for real progress in the implementation of CMS and 
MFA. Importantly for local level prioritisation of and investment in health, the Party Central 
Committee and State Council have issued a decision that instructs city and county people’s 
congresses to make achieving targets in establishing CMS and reducing the numbers of 
people impoverished by ill health ‘an important part’ of local leaders’ performance 
assessment (zhengji kaohe) (Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State 
                                                     
25
 Note that there may be inequalities based on employment status even where CMS is implemented. According to 
Carrin et al (1999) some of the 1994 county level experiments established separate funds for farmers and rural 
enterprise employees. Since enterprise employees paid more into the funds their reimbursement rates were higher. 
26
 Author’s interview, Shanghai, 2001. 
27
 According to Liu et al (2002), in some areas, CMS contributions were included in lists of illegal fees that local 
governments were no longer permitted to levy on villagers. 
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Council 2002). Moreover, central policy documents on CMS have recently begun to argue 
against the view that CMS contributions are unreasonable fees that increase farmers’ burden, 
pointing out that in fact they can reduce farmers’ vulnerability to impoverishment through ill-
health (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Agriculture 2003). Despite 
this, the obstacles to establishing CMS (and MFA) nationwide are still enormous. 
Participation remains voluntary and so CMS continues to be undermined by lack of trust in 
local government as well as problems created by weaknesses in the health system, such as 
poor or costly provision.28 Local government mismanagement of funds and over-reporting of 
participation (so as to obtain higher level subsidies) has been reported even in pilot schemes 
in 2003, indicating that the goal of establishing CMS nationwide will be difficult to attain 
(Gao 2004).  
  
Urban Employee Basic Social Health Insurance, inequality and local governance 
Experimentation with new programmes of urban health insurance began in the early 1990s 
and resulted in the introduction of a new compulsory national framework for urban BSHI in 
December 1998 (State Council 1999). This framework stipulates that city governments must 
establish social health insurance funds into which employers and employees contribute a 
share of their wage bill and wages respectively. Some of the contributions are channelled into 
individual health accounts for participating employees. The insurance fund and the health 
accounts are then used to finance outpatient and inpatient treatment, with patients making co-
payments (either from their accounts or out of their own pockets) alongside those from the 
fund. Gradually since 1999 cities across the country have begun implementing the 
framework.29 
 
The new framework is designed to include employees not only in public institutions and the 
state and collective sectors (that is those who formerly participated in PHI and LI), but also 
private and foreign-invested enterprises, and the self-employed. For those in work, therefore, 
there is now in principle a single system that delivers the same benefits for uniform 
contribution rates (though officials receive some enhanced provisions). This means that the 
late Mao intra-urban pattern of work unit-based inequality in access within cities has been 
tackled. Moreover, where the framework is implemented fully, city-level risk-pooling limits 
the interpersonal inequalities in financial access of the post-Mao period, since some 
                                                     
28
 Farmers are unwilling to contribute to CMS if they think it entitles them to only poor quality services; or if it is 
insufficient to pay for their health expenses. See discussion in (Liu et al. 2002).  
29
 For a discussion of local pilots and the 1998 programme see Duckett (2001), Liu (2002), and Duckett (2004). 
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employees whose employers had not been paying for their health care are now participating in 
the schemes and so once again have insurance (Duckett 2004). 30  
 
However, there are limits to the redistribution involved in BSHI. First, with risk-pooling at 
city level, there are still differences in provision between cities. Although central policy is to 
establish province-wide risk-pooling, this does not seem likely in the short term. Second, 
individual health accounts institutionalise some interpersonal inequalities in financial access 
because employees with higher salaries will accumulate more in them. Third, significant 
interpersonal inequalities in financial access will remain due to the exclusion from the new 
system of the non-working population, notably the long-term unemployed and dependants. 
Although a safety net, Minimum Living Security, has been established in China’s cities to 
provide low-level, means-tested, income support to the poorest urban dwellers, in most cities 
it includes only a very small nominal standard amount for health expenses. And although 
some cities have now also established MFA to assist the poor that mitigates some 
interpersonal inequalities31, it still leaves some vulnerable to impoverishment or at risk of 
going untreated because there are upper limits on the amounts awarded to individuals and co-
payments are required. 32  As in rural areas, continued local fiscal decentralisation and 
prioritisation of economic growth means that local governments are unwilling to commit 
themselves to funding means-tested provisions for the poor. However, recent announcements 
of central government financial assistance of 300 million yuan per year for urban MFA does 
signal that central government is beginning to give financial backing to support and that there 
is therefore also likely to be improvement in implementation of this policy (Taiyuan Daily 
website, 13 September 2004). 
 
Fourth, the national framework for BSHI is not always fully implemented, and in practice 
many enterprises, particularly urban collective and private ones, do not participate in the 
schemes—either because they cannot afford to or because participation would increase their 
                                                     
30
 The inclusion of rural enterprise employees (92 million people, 30% of the rural labour force (Hussain 2000)) in 
urban BSHI means that in principle at least participation in urban health systems for those with rural agricultural 
registration has been accepted, an important step (though it might reduce the viability of CMS schemes).  
31
 The State Council in January 2002 announced the medical treatment assistance for the poor was a priority and 
since then urban governments have been instructed to establish them. Author’s interview, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
2002. 
32
 The upper limit was, for example, 10,000 yuan in Chengdu and Beijing in mid-2004 (Renmin ribao, 4 February 
2002, Sichuan Daily website, Sichuan lianbo, at http://sichuan.scol.com.cn, accessed 24 August 2004, and the 
China National Population and Family Planning Commission website, Zhongguo renkou wang, 
www.chinapop.gov.cn, accessed 25 September 2004). 
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expenditures on health or reduce the quality of their own employees’ health provision 
(Duckett 2001). Moreover, despite the growth of rural-urban migration, there is still 
inequality in access based on household registration. Although in principle the new BSHI 
allows the employees of urban enterprises who have agricultural registration and long-term 
(more than one year) contracts to join the scheme, there is as yet little evidence that they are 
participating in significant numbers.33 Inequalities based on household registration are in part 
due to fiscal decentralisation, which means that local governments are unwilling to finance 
provisions to people from outside their own administrative jurisdictions. The result is a mix of 
eroded or modified late Mao and reform era arrangements that co-exist to create a very varied 
picture across China in which because many individuals do not participate in BSHI, there are 
still significant intra-local inequalities in access. Still, the trend has been strongly toward 
extending the programme to include more urban residents. Nationally, participation in BSHI 
has increased rapidly from just under 19 million in 1998 to 109 million at the end of 2003, 
about 21 per cent of the urban population and 42 per cent of the urban working population 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2003; State Council 2004).34 The challenge now is to 
sustain the improvement in participation so that those in collective and private employment 
are also included.  
 
Although (enterprise) work units are still the main source of finance for urban social health 
insurance, it is no longer organised, administered and delivered by them. These tasks have 
been transferred to urban government social health insurance agencies (part of the new 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security system) who are responsible for administering the 
new social health insurance funds, collecting contributions to them and organising payments 
to health service providers (this involves selecting hospitals and clinics as well as arranging 
and overseeing payment mechanisms). Thus the creation of urban basic social health 
insurance has involved transforming institutions and practices of local governance in a way 
that CMS reform attempts have not. First, responsibility for administering the financing and 
delivery of social insurance benefits has been transferred from work units to local 
governments, which along with other measures such as those to halt the provision of work 
unit housing, constitutes a deliberate move toward abandoning the work unit as an institution 
of governance. This transformation entails a concomitant increase in government 
responsibility for provision although there has been a lag in establishing the mechanisms that 
                                                     
33
 Shanghai and Chengdu are reported to have launched a social security scheme, including medical insurance, for 
migrant workers, in late 2002 and early 2004 respectively (Xinhuanet 23 February 2003, 26 March 2004). Zhejiang 
is reported to have introduced MFA for both urban and rural dwellers (Ministry of Civil Affairs website, at 
www.mca.gov.cn, 20 September 2004, accessed on 25 September 2004). 
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enable social health insurance agencies to enforce employer participation in BSHI and deal 
effectively with the hospitals to which they now provide channel finance. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Inequalities in access to health services: relationships with income inequality, health 
inequalities, and experiences of poverty and social inequality 
Attempts over the 1990s to re-establish some form rural CMS, urban BSHI, and MFA show 
that redistributive, collective solutions have not entirely been abandoned. But governance 
problems are undermining their implementation and reducing the amounts of finance 
available to them. As a result, direct payments ‘out-of pocket’ for health care had risen to 61 
per cent of spending in 2000, something that has contributed significantly in highly unequal 
access to health services (Ministry of Health 2002). It is because of this that in 2000 the WHO 
ranked China only 188th out of 191 countries in terms of the fairness of its health financing 
system (World Health Organization 2000). The primary patterns of inequality are still those 
between countryside and city, and within these sectors between localities and individuals. As 
discussed above, these patterns may also through social institutions such as household and 
workplace interact with and reinforce inequalities due to gender or age.  
 
Inequalities in access to health care are also connected to other dimensions of inequality, 
notably those in income and health, as well as contributing to experiences of social inequality 
and poverty. Interpersonal inequalities in access to health care due to the absence of risk-
pooling CMS or insurance are closely related to income inequalities and may contribute to 
their increase, while illness can also increase poverty. Gu and Tang (1995) cite a 1991 study 
of 60 poor families in Yuhan county in Zhejiang which found that 47 per cent said family 
members’ medical care had forced them into poverty. According to other sources, 30-50 per 
cent of rural households living beneath the poverty line had become impoverished due to 
illness (Liu et al. 1999). In urban areas, too, declining participation in labour insurance means 
risk of impoverishment due to ill health increased in the 1990s.  
 
Local and individual inequalities in access to health services in China also may have 
contributed to growing health inequalities. Despite limited data on the health status of the 
Chinese population in the late Mao era, we know that there were significant health 
inequalities. For example, the World Bank in 1981 reported higher mortality rates and poorer 
nutrition in the countryside than in urban areas (Hillier and Jie 1996: 263). However, there are 
some indications that despite sustained growth in China’s economy health inequalities have 
                                                                                                                                                        
34
 Population data for 2003 from the State Statistical Bureau (State Statistical Bureau 2004). 
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on some indicators increased since then. Data on inter-provincial and rural-urban differences, 
for example, indicate increases for indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality 
(Hossain 1997; Liu et al. 1999).35 Although health inequalities are caused by a combination of 
many factors including age, diet, access to clean water, as well as housing conditions, 
working conditions and perhaps social status and social inequalities, inequalities in access to 
health services are likely to have had an influence. Since ill-health is likely to be more 
prevalent among the poor, the fact that health service provision is weakest in areas where risk 
of poverty is highest means that provision is particularly inequitable. And since ill-health may 
also increase the risk of poverty, inequalities in health service provision may be contributing 
to a vicious circle of deepening poverty and ill-health. 
 
Finally, since those on the lowest incomes in China are the least likely to have adequate 
health protection, poor access to both preventive services and especially medical treatment 
has added a new dimension to experiences of poverty in China. Being poor now means being 
more vulnerable to disease, having to suffer illness without access to many medicines and 
treatments or only to very low quality services in often unsanitary conditions, and so living 
with the fear of serious disease and ill-health.  
 
Health financing, local governance and the prospects for improving access to health services 
The national policy initiatives since 2003 may indicate a new political will among leaders at 
the centre to prioritise health. The SARS outbreak that year, as well as China’s low WHO 
ranking for the fairness of its health system in 2000, and the spread of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic have focussed more attention on the health system, and apparently created a 
determination to push things forward not only in relation to HIV/AIDS and other 
communicable disease prevention, but also with improving access to health services through 
‘new-type’ CMS and MFA. Central government budgetary investment has increased in 
support of these policies. 
 
However, improving access to health services in China requires more than political will at the 
top, new policy initiatives, and the allocation of ad hoc earmarked central government 
investment. Although these are all important, access is significantly influenced by modes of 
health financing and provision that are closely tied into wider local governance systems and 
practices. The commune, work unit, and planning system that contributed to more equitable 
                                                     
35
 In 2001, for example, the infant mortality rate in Beijing was 6 per thousand live births, while that of Ningxia 
was 33 per thousand. There was also a gap in maternal mortality rates, with Beijing reporting a rate of 12 per 
100,000 live births while Ningxia reported 73 per 100,000 (Ministry of Health 2002).  
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access in the past are no longer functioning, while new systems and practices in the era of 
market reform such as fiscal decentralisation, local government administration of social 
insurance, and the prioritisation of economic growth through new incentive systems for 
officials, create new obstacles to rebuilding CMS and extending urban BSHI.36 Perhaps the 
most important steps towards tackling the problem would be those in the sphere of health 
financing to deal with the negative consequences of fiscal decentralisation, and those in the 
sphere of local governance to improve the capacity of the new social insurance and other 
government agencies. 
 
In terms of health financing, first, there is a need for more central government financial 
intervention. As Wong notes in her contribution to this volume, central government transfers 
back to the provinces have shifted significantly away from disequalising tax rebates towards a 
greater share of more redistributive earmarked grants.37 However, these earmarked grants 
need to be reviewed, rationalised and better targeted, and they need to operate alongside more 
and better local health financing (World Bank 2002). Second, to tackle the problem of 
disincentives for local governments to invest in health (both in services and health protection 
systems for their populations) that has been created by fiscal decentralisation, governance 
reforms are important. Decentralisation hinders the creation of a nation-wide (even province-
wide) health insurance system and a more equitable health system. Central co-ordination of 
health planning and resource allocation, including prioritisation of redistribution within the 
health system could contribute to tackling this problem, but both local investment in health 
and the implementation of urban social health insurance could be improved by making them 
an important component of local leaders’ performance targets.38  
 
But simply increasing finance alone will not tackle some of the most serious obstacles to 
improving access. To ensure that government investment is used effectively and more 
efficiently, certain local governance systems and practices need to be improved. Two issues 
                                                     
36
 I assume here that a first practical step toward equalising access would be to fully implement CMS and BSHI so 
that most of the population has some health protection, though this would not in itself tackle the problem of the 
rural-urban divide. Nor would it provide for urban dwellers without work, who are not eligible to participate in 
BSHI. A long list of other recommendations relating to improvement of health service provision, especially in 
rural areas, are give in by the World Bank (2002), and Liu et al. (2002). I deal here with those that are most 
fundamental to the issue of equality, financing, and local governance. 
37
 See also a report by the World Bank that shows tax rebates to have fallen from 72% of central transfers in 1996 
to 45% in 2001 (2002: 19).  
38
 In 2002, the central party and government announced that health targets would be included in the performance 
targets of officials (Bloom and Fang 2003). And this has been reiterated more recently (see above). Much depends 
on how this is done—which officials, and how important the health targets are in evaluations of performance.  
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are central here: first, delineation of responsibilities need to be clearer. For example, in the 
countryside CMS work needs to be better integrated into county and township administration. 
Second, administrative capacities of new government agencies could be improved. For 
example, new urban social health insurance departments’ capacity to monitor employers and 
ensure all their employees participate in BSHI would increase participation in this scheme. At 
present, departments are better at ensuring the participation of state enterprises (though they 
do not always ensure that their all their employees participate) than private sector businesses. 
Social health insurance departments, as ‘third party payers’ of patients’ medical expenses, 
could through better systems for monitoring and paying health service providers, strengthen 
their capacity to tackle the incentives to over-prescribe medicines, provide unnecessary 
diagnostic tests and require informal payments. At present they lack experience in dealing 
with providers, and while participation in BSHI is low, they are not major purchasers of 
health services and so lack influence. Thus improving participation in BSHI can help increase 
departments’ capacity to deal with service providers. 
 
Should these and the recommendations for improving the quality of basic health services be 
implemented, the prospects for reducing interpersonal inequalities through re-establishing 
CMS and extending BSHI would be significantly improved, though the re-establishment of 
CMS may also require tackling the wider lack of trust in rural government, while extending 
BSHI to urban dwellers without work would require substantial state investment. 39  This 
would in itself be a major accomplishment, even though it would neither tackle the 
entrenched rural-urban inequalities in the system nor the new and growing inequalities in the 
cities. China’s rural dwellers continue to be those to whom progress comes most slowly and 
with least state budgetary support, though there is now a growing urban underclass that is 
little better off. 
 
 
                                                     
39
 While village elections have been introduced in part to try to deal with such problems, there as yet no evidence 
that they result in the development of collective mechanisms for financing health or the provision of other public 
goods. 
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*This paper has benefited from discussions with Lesley Doyal, Marianne Hester and Randall 
Smith, as well as from the comments of participants at the workshop “Paying for Progress” 
held at the University of Oxford in May 2004, notably Athar Hussain, Vivienne Shue, 
Christine Wong, Carl Riskin and Ran Tao.  
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